From Sixth Grade to the Shoe Factory

This is a critique on Moffet's article.


This article certainly represents a quintessential instance of the exasperating boggle of being caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Vicente’s predicament is indeed dire, grim and fraught with unfavorable circumstances that he could potentially incur by preserving his new ‘career’ at the shoe factory. However, there is something important to be said about the prospects that await children and their families should they decide to stay in school and continue their education at the expense of their loved ones and their extremely daunting financial straits.

The article gets the ball rolling: “When Vincent Guerrero reported for work at the shoe factory he had to leave his yo-yo with the guard at the door” (Moffett 88). Poignant as this narration is, it is impossible to ignore the pitiable pathetic fallacy it contains. This red herring raises a waiving yellow flag not worth overlooking. Moffett wends describing the precarious and perilous conditions of the workplace and the environment in which Vicente was being foisted to perform. The poor youngster had to “shinny up the press and throw all his 90 pounds backward to yank the stiff steel bar downward”, and of course this “reminded him [this inexperienced little facetious boy] of the playground contraption” (Ibid). I am completely sure that older people, too, are often forced to work in far more dangerous and physically challenging environments. Notwithstanding this shameless piece of casuistry, there are corresponding legal regulations that must be taken into consideration before moving forward. It is true that Mexico jurisprudence prohibits infants under the age of 14 to join the workforce, such regulatory injunction being enacted in order to prevent abuse by parents who send their unwilling kids out onto the streets to make a profit. However in this case, the article does not provide good reasons to believe that Vicente was being compulsorily instituted as a member of factory’s staff. Quite the contrary, it elaborates on how the 12 year old kid acknowledged the benefits of having dropped out of school and becoming one more pillar in his family’s economy incrementing significantly their revenue stream. Granted, a decent case can be made condemning the perils that await laborers working for extended periods of time in such insalubrious conditions, i.e., inhaling the allegedly poisonous effluvium which emanates from toxic glue, especially given the absence of adequate ventilation. The fact that Vicente came down with a respiratory illness presenting symptoms like: cough, burning eyes, nausea, etc., also casts our position in a dimmer light. Nonetheless, I have long been a strong advocate of personal autonomy, and although children at this age cannot be relied upon to make truly informed decisions, the reading makes it clear that “Economic necessity is stronger than theoretical prohibition” (Ibid).

It is apparent from the narrative as well that, given the meager financial freedoms Vincent’s family live in, being employed at the age of twelve by a shoe making company is not so much a matter of heedful decision making as much as it is a matter of finding a way to subsist. If their reality is as red in tooth and claw as it is being portrayed along the touching lines of Moffett’s impeaching article, then scouring the moral landscape for favorable alternatives in this context is, indeed, a fool’s errand.

I shall now proceed through the scant number of alternatives imaginable and the way in which these embody a frivolous disservice to this unprivileged class. One -and perhaps the most conspicuous, alternative path to follow is that of a continued education. The article emphasized the promising intellectual character of the child; doubtless a prosperous mathematician, possibly a future educator or engineer and maybe even a doctor. Nonetheless, the wages therein mentioned are, at the very least, dispiriting. Vicente’s dad is purported to make 180,000 Mexican pesos per week. The twelve year old is said to earn weekly the miserable amount of 100,000 Mexican pesos per week. Despite their joint income (and bearing in mind that two members of his household had been laid off) and after 3 decades of hard work, they are forced to live in the most destitute and marginal habitat, evinced in the article as:

“…a tumbledown brick shell about the size and shape of a baseball dugout. It is home to 25 people, maybe 26”, and it adds that: “Vicente, to get some privacy in the bedroom he shares with 8 other children occasionally rigs a crude tent from the laundry on the clothesline crisscrossing the hut” (Ibid 89).

Talk about human dignity. Their predicament is in no way encouraging. But there is one more salary that surfaced in the article: that of a teacher’s. A teacher reportedly makes the weekly sum of 120,000 Mexican pesos. That is 60 thousand less than dad and 20 thousand more than the kid. If these figures have any credibility, our intellectual and philosophical wherewithal to build a moral argument in favor of Vicente’s furtherance of academic education diminishes neatly to the point of nonexistence. One can only imagine the quality of life borne by a teacher in light of her lower-than-a-laborer’s income. What can we tell the kid in order to incentivize him and encourage him to stay in school and take additional training? How can we foment his academic aspirations, as noble as the might be, if the pursuit of a professional career will only make inroads at the cost of his and his family’s current interests and stability?

And as far as the ethical responsibility that lies in the hands of those who are in a position to hire underage children, I hope I have explicated to some discernible detail the extent to which the consequences in this context would accrue. If the contractor’s choice is 1) to hire or 2) not to hire, when hiring willful children (underage as they might be) whose parents are in the best disposition to comply, entails the betterment of their condition, then to withhold recruitment is not only wrong, but to a degree, even perverse. These children’s horizons are not as ample as most people imagine, and providing their families with work and a fixed income at least gives them the opportunity to survive. Considering that nobody’s interests are being unnecessarily thwarted, and that no viable option promises to ameliorate their situation, I submit that I see no reason in this context to favor further education over willful labor work.

Landon Ross rails against no-fly-zone detractors

Over at The Rational Ape Landon Ross has written a great article: Action in Lybia is Way Overdue. In it, he admonishes from the get-go:

If the U.S. maintains its position miles behind the U.K., France, and even the Arab League, by continually vacillating and expressing “deep concern” at the slaughter of an Arab people fighting to emancipate themselves from the yoke of tyranny, it will be another stain on the history of American foreign policy serving to further drain the U.S. of what moral authority it retains.

I couldn't agree more. But one can already hear the invective voices of moral relativists  and a selected brand of spineless left-wing liberals suffused with indignation  at the very thought of another US intervention. Landon rightly anticipates their reaction and their banal use of a well known fallacy:

To those critics who predictably chime “Iraq War” at the very mention of a no-fly-zone over Libya: advocating one strategic blunder by reminding us of another does neither the U.S. nor the Libyans any good.

The fallacy of False Analogy, albeit an informal fallacy -given that its error lies in the validity of the content and not in the logical structure of the argument- is ultimately applicable in this case. If action X had Z consequences in place Y,  then action X must also have Z consequences in place W. It's really hard to overlook such blatant piece of intellectual sophistry.

Landon, of course, goes on to remind us that:

...the no-fly-zone over Iraq was something of an effective policy, at least after 1993 when Saddam's aggressions toward patrolling aircraft were met with effective reprisals.

So we know that the reasoning behind the analogy is extremely subtle. However, I think that the chief quandary behind whether there is a legitimate justification for our intrusion in foreign soil won't get settled until after the adjudication of and ethical dilemma. Given our current national budget deficit oscillating in the vicinity of the trillions of dollars, and the political uprising that is astir in our own country; do we really have the political and financial wherewithal to afford a worldwide display of kindness and empathy? Because if we do, I'd like to propose another country in need of military intervention. It is a closest neighbor in the south and is being ravaged by an internecine conflict between drug cartels and the national military.  

The Sound the Universe Makes

Janna Levin delivered a most florid talk on cosmic sonic emissions.

We tend think of space as an eerily silent darkness. And in a way that is correct as sound waves cannot propagate in a vacuum, and many of the comments below the video allude precisely to this quandary.  Another points that elicits some inquietude is the fact that light is incapable of escaping black holes given of course the intensity of their gravitational pull. So, how can any sound -whose velocity is much less than that of light- emerge from their collisions?

Levin helpfully elucidates her critics via a comment stating that:

The medium is spacetime. It can ring like a drum -- a three-dimensional drum.

These are not "sound waves" but "gravitational waves". The waves in space itself can be measured, soon we hope, and those waveforms plugged into a stereo to generate actual sound

I'm no expert in the field so I still have my doubts, not necessarily about the veracity of her claims but as to the process behind it. All in all, however, it was a mesmerizing lecture and I recommend it fully.

Harris recoils from Muslim's obscene unctuousness.

Sam Harris has written a brief response on his website expressing his discontent after a Muslim parliamentarian, during last Friday's broadcast of Real Time with Bill Maher, bloviated a most earnestly dishonest apology for Islamic terrorism.

As it is now a trend among educated western Muslims, the tendency to disavow the actual scripted tenets of their faith, has become ever more grating by the day. They conveniently reinterpret the ghoulish verses in the Koran in a way that renders them as little more than a horrific metaphor. Sam Harris designated five pages of his book to exposing some of the most ill-willed and indubitably hostile verses in the Koran, but when confronted with these, (as witnessed by Maher's youtube video on the link shown above) Muslims almost perfunctorily dismiss them as simply a case of isolated quotation taken out of context. One is then anxious to ask:  In which context then, are these overtly cruel and bigoted propositions justifiable?  

I also would like to know if, in this case, Representative and Islamic apologist Keith Ellison's insouciant response to actual Islamic threat is indeed deliberately cynical or simply misinformed. I just wish Bill would have drilled him more with direct quotations from the book. Quotations so conspicuously ghastly that even if Keith decided to evade them by pulling the out-of-context card, the egregious reading had stayed engraved in the minds of listeners.

Russel on who deserves contempt and who is simply helplessly pitiable.

Russel has posted on his blog his thoughts on an analysis brought forth by Aikin and Talisse regarding what constitutes a good reason to feel contempt for someone, or simply empathy and pity.

As it concerns Aikin and Talisse, somebody who has a considerable form of intellectual impairment is automatically exonerated on that very basis. Contempt for the expressions of the mentally disabled is simply absurd. So far I concur. However, they go on to argue that:

To see religious believers as proper objects of contempt, then, is to see them as people who should know better than to believe as they do. It is hence to see them as wrong but, importantly, not stupid..

Notwithstanding a variety of nuanced -and I believe highly discrepant- notions of freewill, what exactly spurs and drives our beliefs and thus our behavior? -We may wonder. Two things: our genes and our environment. So, if this restricted twofold engine of human ability is the sole root that gives rise to beliefs (whether correct, equivocal or flat out delusional) then there really is no room for free will, is there? And so it follows that the mentally handicap and those who had the misfortune of growing up in intense and oppressive ambient religiosity or unreason, stand on the same moral ground. In other words, because neither of them chose what spurred their delusions, neither of the two deserve our contempt.

But then, Russel would perhaps retort that, taken to its logical conclusions, this elaborate semi-syllogistic argument would undermine as a corollary all feelings of admiration. And he would be right. In a way -and as a parenthetical note- this is why we need the illusion of free will.

 On a similar note I find it interesting that no explicit mention of intention surfaced on Russel's review, but for for a small mention of intellectual honesty. Intention, by my lights, merits much more attention and consideration when before we chastise somebody with our expressed contempt/disdain/hate on the basis of their views. I wouldn't feel contempt for anybody who didn't intend to harm me in any way. I might deem them wrong, benighted, misled and hardheaded but never worthy of disgrace.

Sam Harris' condemnation of recent tax cuts.

This is a bit old but I recently found this interesting missive on Sam's official website wherein he offers a critical analysis of the recent republican resolution to cut taxes for the wealthy. It is beautifully written as we would expect from Harris, but it's also sage and persuasive.

The Ethics of Control Studies Regarding HIV Babies by Heber Gurrola

Medical research and the way in which it is normally carried out has, for quite a long time, being the subject of many ethical and moral concerns. Nonetheless, the conclusions so far inferred tend to incline toward decisions that make use of, one the one hand, utilitarian approaches whereby the chief moral preoccupations are related to the number of people benefitted from the outcome, and on the other hand, deontological principles establishing absolute concepts like that of “individual rights”. Given the broadness of this topic, I shall focus primarily on the first ethical issue raised in the article. I will hereby argue that some of the research standards currently being applied domestically are right to vary when research is exported to foreign countries -this, of course, being merely corollary given the difference in population and incidence of disease. I shall also point out that the principle of personal autonomy as well as the use of consequentialist morality should suffice to underpin and dispel the ethical concerns conventionally raised by critics.

According to the article, medical researchers have found a substance that could potentially prevent pregnant women infected with HIV from transmitting the disease to their infants. However, in order for this new medication to be approved by the FDA, researchers must execute a control study consisting of an experimental group (A) and a control group (B). Group A is comprised of a random sample of women living under similar conditions whose purpose is to ingest the new medication – the one hypothesized to be effective. Group B will be formed by the exact same type of constituency, except that, in this case, women will be given placebo pills, i.e., a substance known to be ineffective; this in order to rule out all peripheral factors whose influence could alter the results.  

One of the primary ethical concerns regarding this study is the variation in test standards as they are applied in the States compared to their application in foreign countries. The article mentions one of the putative problems as being that of a reduction in the expenses when research is exported to a developing country. Regulatory controls differ depending on the country, e.g. “Hungary relied on one full time inspector who annually visited only about 30 of some 200 test locations in the country. Even if abuses were found the inspector lacked the power to fine or bar researchers from the test” (Kline 129). Admittedly, this type of excessive lenience invites a variety of acts of negligence on the part of researchers, who, by virtue of this faulty regulatory system, are given free rein to utilize some tactics that a more stringent system would not allow. However, as I shall discuss later, these apparent ethical concerns are simply immaterial or nonexistent once we introduce the principle of personal autonomy into the equation. Another inconformity brought to light in the article has to do with the sheer amount of people who will be administered placeboes and how this figure increases significantly when research is undertaken in a developing country. The thinking goes like this regarding the transmission of disease to infants: “If the medication proves effective, group A will find themselves favored by the experiment, whereas group B,” this casuistry continues,  “having taken merely placeboes, will have irreversibly suffered the consequences of being given an ineffectual pill.” 

Again, personal autonomy comes to the rescue here, not without the help of its loyal sidekick who goes by the name of utilitarianism. Finally, the other issue raised in the article complains about the fact that people in third world countries who are recruited for testing, in many cases, would not even be able to afford the drug should this turn out to be successful. This claim is at best specious and I will explain why. 

Provided that every individual subjected to the tests is fully informed of (a) the risks involved (b) the quality of the treatment (to the extent allowed, obviously, by the standards of a blind control study) and (c) the stipend afforded to participants, I see no reason why anything about this study should be deemed immoral. The principle of personal autonomy suggests that every individual ought to be granted complete independence and the freedom to act according to his/her will, the only caveat is, nearly by definition, that his/her actions should not cause harm to others, which would be an infringement upon the other’s personal liberty. By this light, given that the participants of the study are not being deceived by mercenary researchers, and being fully aware of their right to decline the offer to partake in the test, it would seem patently immoral  not to carry out a study that could potentially save the lives of many. In other words, it must be every participant’s willful decision to be a part of the test, as it otherwise, would be an outrageous transgression into their personal autonomy. Nothing in the text suggests that this is not the case. 

Anther quandary involves the ineluctable consequences awaiting the control group if the medication turns out to be effective. This claim implies that the more people we have in our pool of testers, the more people will find themselves affected for not having been treated with real medication. In this vein, if, say, a researcher’s limited budget gives her the solvency to recruit 4000 participants in the States, but in Sudan she would be able to afford the testing of a wider group of people, say, 10,000 volunteers, making for far more accurate results with a slimmer margin of error, it would be ludicrous to withhold the export of such research. Granted, 10,000 participants in Sudan would entail that the 5,000 of them who belong to group B experience a collective demolition of their hopes thereupon transmitting HIV to their children, whereas group A, having been administered the right stuff will reap the fruits of the successful study. Kant would hasten to interject here and declare that lying is categorically wrong, and therefore placebo pills have no place in a moral society. But the utilitarian thinker would retort that lying in this case is not only meritorious, but morally obligatory. It is precisely control studies of this sort that have given modern medicine its scientific validity.  And it is this specific testing method that spells out the difference between medicine, or for that matter, science in general, and other forms of post hoc ergo propter hoc pseudo-epistemology. Clearly, a successful control study would bring enormous benefits to, not just the people who participate in the test, but to the entire population in need of a medical remedy, which is to say that a greater good would be achieved in light of these findings. Decidedly, another objection in Kant’s pigeonhole of complaints to this consequentialist technique would be that individual rights are being curtailed by the dereliction of treat-people-as-ends-in-themselves imperative.  By administering medically vacuous placeboes to a large number of people who may expect positive results, Kant would say that we are using group B as a means to an end. Nonetheless, Mill would come back with a response alluding to the fact that if (a) the experiment ends up being successful, this research would be credited with saving millions of lives, and if (b) the test turns out to be a failure and the medication doesn’t work, people would still be compensated and no harm that wouldn’t have befallen them anyway would take place.  On a tangential note, another concern that surfaced was that of the affordability of the hypothetically successful medicine to the denizens of this financially limited country. Perhaps the medication, once approved by the FDA, would not meet a sufficiently low cost necessary for it to be purchased by our third world country testers. This sounds outrageous in and of itself. In this respect, it’s also noted that “the company suggested the final drug could be made available at a reduced price for citizens of those countries in which the test took place” (Kline 132). Fair enough! The author adds: “…such an outcome might promise benefits for enough of the population to justify the likely health costs to a few test participants” (Ibid). We understand that the “few test participants” refers to members of group B, but the statement leaves one wondering what the alleged “health costs” to the few really are. 

Lastly, I feel compelled to question the moral status of a possible restriction of exports which have not been approved by the producing country. One, and I think the most salient, of the claims against the export of products previously prohibited in the producing country is that other places may simply have a more permissive criterion for allowing in imports, thereupon giving way to loopholes that the producing country could use to infiltrate its unapproved medication. What is the fallacy here? The fallacy lies in the presumption of scientific hegemony on the part of the producing country, that their narrow standards for approval are somehow more accurate than the looser ones in the importing country. This could not necessarily be the case. Perhaps, in this particular instance, the FDA has over-narrowed its criteria if only to reduce all potential harm, whereas the accepting country, in light of their own research, has devised less strict, nevertheless more accurate and comprehensive, standards for admission. The truth is that we simply don’t know whose standards are more adequately adjusted. Hence, to limit the scope of our sales solely to the producing country is to prejudge and undermine the validity of control regulations brought forth by other countries which deem the product acceptable.

Closing, it is perfectly clear that a number of moral tradeoffs are necessary in order to make headway in the scientific arena. It might be necessary to inflict some degree of harm for the purpose of producing more happiness to more people. Therefore, to the extent that the interests of a people or corporation are not being foisted upon the less privileged, i.e. as long as individual rights are not being stepped on, autonomous individuals, which we all are, should be free to give consent to whatever they will. The moral status of an action is indeed a function of the consequences it entails for those involved. Would the world be a better place if no control studies of the type aforementioned were permitted? I don’t think so. In fact the central question should be: Would the populations among which this scientific testing was conducted be better off without the researchers’ intervention? As demonstrated by the history of scientific research the answer would have to be absolutely not. Should the established state of affairs suddenly change and control studies brought about nothing but detriment to the tested population, only then would it follow that such studies are immoral.